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After decades of cycling violence between Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda and Burundi 
violence peaked in 1994 with a genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda.  During the Rwandan genocide 
the Hutu majority slaughtered 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus, leaving the country with 
120,000 accused genocidaires awaiting trial.  Rwanda’s gacaca courts were established as a 
response to the backlog of untried genocide cases.  These courts disturbingly distinguish between 
genocide and war crimes committed during the same era, trying only those accused of genocide 
crimes.  We argue that the gacaca process will contribute to the insecurity of all Rwandan 
citizens in the future since it pursues inequitable justice, accentuates the ethnic divide and will be 
interpreted as revenge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We would like to thank the Human Needs and Global Resources program at Wheaton College 
for their support of the research for this project.  We are also grateful to the many people we 
spoke with in Rwanda who need to remain unnamed and to an outside reviewer for a very 
insightful set of comments. 
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 In a mere 100 days, between April and July of 1994, nearly one million Rwandans were 
killed by their neighbors, friends, families and fellow citizens in the most devastating act of 
collective violence in recent history.  Without taking action, the world watched as Hutus 
slaughtered their Tutsi and moderate Hutu neighbors.1  Also during these three months, tens of 
thousands of Rwandan women were raped and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were 
internally displaced or became refugees.  The Rwandan genocide was more than ethnic 
oppression, exiled refugees, political instability and murder.  It was also the most horrific 
rotation-to-date in the continuing cycles of ethnic violence that have constituted Rwandan history 
since independence. 
In the following paragraphs we will document the cycles of violence that have occurred 
in Rwandan society and assess the future of Tutsi and Hutu security.  We will consider the 
implications of the new gacaca courts, an indigenous legal procedure that has been adapted to 
process accused perpetrators of genocide.  It is our belief that the gacaca courts will intensify a 
distorted sense of justice and a desire for vengeance among the Hutu majority in Rwanda, 
thereby contributing to rather than curtailing the risk of ethnic violence in the long run.   
We begin this paper by discussing the historical context leading up to the Rwandan 
genocide and the way the genocide is viewed by both Hutu and Tutsi populations in Rwanda.  
This will be followed by a description of the gacaca process and an assessment of the 
implications for the long-term security of ethnic groups in Rwanda.  We conclude with some 
suggestions for better ensuring the security of all Rwandan citizens. 
                                                 
1
 We use “Hutu”, “Tutsi” and “Twa” instead of the plural forms “Bahutu”, “Batutsi” and “Batwa” to describe the 
three people groups within Rwanda.  Moderate Hutus would be those who were interested in power-sharing with 
Tutsis and opposed the violence against the Tutsi population. 
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HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 Recounting history is always a political endeavor as there are many “truths” from which 
to form a narrative.  There are competing interpretations of Rwanda’s historical events.  Rene 
Lemarchand refers to these different versions of history as the “cognitive maps” of Rwandans 
and it is perhaps not surprising that they are dissimilar for Hutu and Tutsi.2  Hutu and Tutsi 
collective memories of political events in Rwanda diverge in critical areas.  This is both 
important to note from an anthropological and historical perspective as well as relevant 
politically as these collective memories have been used to justify violence and therefore have life 
and death consequences. 
 At the heart of the matter are two prominent and competing narratives regarding the 
source of ethnic conflict, hatred, and violence.  One historical description suggests that the 
people of Rwanda, often called the Banyarwanda, were peacefully co-existing ethnic groups until 
they became subject to colonial authorities.  German and Belgian conceptions of race and 
policies of favoritism created an atmosphere of ethnic rivalry in which the Tutsi were elevated 
above the Hutu.  The second account insists that ethnic discord is rooted in pre-colonial history, 
and that these previously existing divisions were merely exacerbated by changes wrought by 
colonial domination.  For purposes of this article, we will label the former “Tutsi” and the later 
“Hutu.”  These narratives represent polar extremes on the spectrum of Rwandan historical 
understanding.  While it seems simplistic to say that Tutsis adhere to the former historical 
perspective and Hutus to the later, one can largely do so.  Mahmood Mamdani and Gerard 
Prunier both note that even scholars are labeled pro-Hutu or pro-Tutsi depending on which 
                                                 
2
 René Lemarchand, “Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?,” African Studies Review 
41, no. 1 (April 1998): 5. 
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historical narrative they accept.3  Our observations of Rwandan-led reconciliation workshops 
affirm that there is a divide in opinions regarding history that follows ethnic lines.4 
The account attributing ethnic inequalities to the colonial authorities is the official 
position of the current government and that associated with the Tutsi population – no surprise 
given that the government is predominantly Tutsi.5  The Rwandan government is trying to create 
a unifying historical narrative that will contribute, and not inhibit, political reconstruction and 
ethnic reconciliation.  Therefore, the government would like to emphasize the peaceful 
cohabitation that once existed, and to minimize talk of “natural” or “ancient” antagonisms 
between ethnic groups. 
As told from the “Tutsi” perspective, the Twa, Tutsi and Hutu people groups co-existed 
relatively peacefully before the appearance of European settlers.  The pygmoid Twa, now less 
than one percent of the population, migrated into Rwanda from the forests of modern day 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and were the first to settle in the area.  The predominantly 
agricultural Hutus were the next immigrants, followed by cattle-herding Tutsis in the 14th or 15th 
century.  Over time, a system arose in which Tutsi kings employed cattle, land and military 
chiefs to rule over local groups of the majority Hutu and minority Twa and Tutsi peoples.  
Though Rwandan oral tradition attests to instances of Tutsi king (mwami) brutality towards Hutu 
subjects, this aggression is mitigated by the cohesion of the pre-colonial population at large.  The 
average Hutu and Tutsi led comparable lifestyles, held common religious beliefs, spoke the same 
                                                 
3
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 19-39 and 
Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 30. 
Moreover, there is increasing debate regarding the biased nature of some of the scholarship on Rwandan history 
published after the genocide. See Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the 
Late Twentieth Century, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
4
 This is based on observations between August and November 2002 in Kigali, Ruhengeri, and Cyangugu. 
5
 The politicians composing the government are from a variety of ethnic groups, though predominantly Tutsi.  The 
government’s overview of Rwandan history is available at their official web site: [Web site 
http://www.rwanda1.com/government/].  [cited April 19 2003]. 
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language, co-developed music and dance and intermarried.  The distinction between Hutu and 
Tutsi was primarily occupational, and the barrier between the two was flexible and permeable.  
Ethnic identities were malleable depending on the social status and wealth of the family.  For 
example, those referred to as Tutsis typically owned more cattle.  Newbury, in her discussion of 
contested histories, explains the central importance of clan, lineage, and family ties over ethnic 
identity for Rwandan social interaction from a Tutsi historical understanding.6  From this “Tutsi” 
perspective, Hutu and Tutsi pre-colonial relations were predominantly peaceful. 
The second “Hutu” historical narrative places more emphasis on the nature of pre-
colonial Tutsi domination.  In this view, the legitimacy of Tutsi authority went largely 
unquestioned, especially when successful conquests and divine attributes were accorded to the 
local Tutsi lords.  Newbury expounds this position when she writes, “Hutu were conquered in the 
distant past by clever and wily Tutsi, who imposed an exploitative rule on Hutu and made them 
the servants of Tutsi.”7  The ruling mwami oppressed the Hutu and Twa populations through 
forced labor.  For example, as payment for occupying land Hutu were forced to donate their 
labor to Tutsi chiefs.  In an agricultural society where land is critical to subsistence, this 
arrangement clearly established a caste-like system.  Tutsi physical features and social claims to 
aristocracy advanced their power and prestige among the Hutu and Twa.8  The serious social 
inequalities abounding in pre-colonial Rwanda laid the foundation for future discrimination.  
From this perspective, Hutu subjugation was well developed by the time of colonization.  
Whichever historical perspective one accepts, it is clear that firm cleavages between the interests 
of the two dominant ethnic groups were present during the colonial era. 
                                                 
6
 Catherine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (1998): 7-24. 
7
 Newbury. 
8
 Mamdani disagrees with this point in his When Victims Become Killers (2001), contending that claims to Tutsi 
superiority based upon physical features originated in the colonial (and not the pre-colonial) era. 
 7 
Rwanda’s colonial period began in 1885 when Germany claimed the land of Rwanda and 
Burundi at the Conference of Berlin (though it did not gain full colonial power until 1910, after 
many years of negotiations with Britain and Belgium).  The Germans indirectly governed their 
new territory, ruling through the mwami and local chiefs who in turn benefited from the support 
of German administrators. 
At the conclusion of World War I, the Germans lost all of their colonial possessions, 
including Rwanda.  Though the Belgians had control of the area since 1916, only after the war 
did the League of Nations officially grant them colonial authority of Ruanda-Urundi, the land 
that encompasses modern-day Rwanda and Burundi.  Under the colonial development of a cash 
crop economy, the labor obligations that had began during pre-colonial times were reinforced, 
and further distanced the ruling elite from peasant classes.  In 1935, the Belgians issued ethnic 
identity cards and registered Banyarwanda as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa.  Experiments were conducted 
in order to “scientifically” determine the physical attributes of each ethnic group.  Hutus were 
seen as shorter and stockier with slightly redder skin and wider noses.  Tall, lanky, darker-
skinned Banyarwanda were categorized as Tutsi.9  These physical stereotypes of Hutu and Tutsi 
remain ingrained in the population. 
As independence loomed, Belgians hastily transferred their allegiance from Tutsi elites to 
the majority Hutu population – Hutus comprise approximately 85% of the population, Tutsis 
15% and Twa less than 1%.  With the assistance of the Catholic Church, Belgian officials helped 
establish the Parti du Mouvement et d’Emanicipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU) which was intended 
to free Hutus of Tutsi oppression.  Growing Hutu political aspirations prior to independence led 
to the development of the Hutu manifesto in 1957, a document infamous for its catalytic role in 
the establishment of racist language employed by both Tutsi and Hutu.  In 1959, the Belgians 
                                                 
9
 Mamdani, 44. 
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supported a Hutu-led revolution to overthrow the ruling Tutsi powers.  The political violence of 
this year was directed primarily against Tutsi government administrators though it did not take 
long for the rhetoric of hatred to ignite indiscriminate violence.10  The PARMEHUTU massacred 
and displaced thousands of Tutsis, thereby taking on the role of the ruling class.  “Hutu used the 
ideas once prized by the Tutsi…to justify the violence of the revolution and the discriminatory 
measures of the years afterwards.”11  This revolution began a cycle of ethnic violence that would 
recur over and over in the post-independence era.  
Gregoire Kayibanda, leader of the “Hutu Power” movement, went on to win the nation’s 
first internationally recognized election and the Republic of Rwanda gained independence on 
July 1st 1962.  According to the current Rwandan government, “The First Republic, under 
President Kayibanda, institutionalized discrimination against Batutsi and periodically used 
massacres against this targeted population as a means of maintaining the status quo.”12  In 1963 
and 1969, thousands of Tutsis fled or were forcefully displaced in further massacres; throughout 
the decade Kayibanda’s administration enacted state-led discrimination against the Tutsi 
minority who were regularly denied equal education and employment. 
In 1972, Burundi, itself composed of a population split between Hutu and Tutsi, 
experienced a genocide in which Tutsis murdered their Hutu neighbors.  This fostered an 
increase in anti-Tutsi sentiments in Rwanda, which contributed to a coup of extremist Hutus in 
1973 led by Major General Juvenal Habyarimana.  Kayibanda, political leaders from his 
administration, and many other Tutsis were killed, and successive waves of massacres continued 
                                                 
10
 The current Rwandan government’s perspective is that 1959 was the first year in their nation’s history that leaders 
preached violence to the population, and that these messages triggered the cycles of genocide.  A summary of the 
Rwandan government’s viewpoint is available at http://www.rwanda1.com/government/ cited April 19 2003. 
11
 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999): 
40. 
12
 See  http://www.rwanda1.com/government/ cited April 19 2003. 
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against Tutsi groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s (including especially violent mass killings 
in 1975).13  Also, divisions among Hutus became more marked through these two decades with 
the Hutu of the north (Habyarimana’s birthplace) becoming increasingly estranged from their 
Hutu neighbors to the south.  Nonetheless, membership in Habyarimana’s political party, the 
Mouvement Révoluntionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), remained obligatory 
for all Rwandans and Habyarimana was successfully re-elected in 1978, 1983 and again in 1988 
(in all three cases he was the sole candidate).  Habyarimana’s regime was aggressively supported 
by a clique referred to as the little house (akazu), of which his wife, Agathe Habyarimana was an 
especially influential member.  What is important to note from this brief history is the recurrent 
cycling of ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi.  Thus, though there are other cleavages in the 
Rwandan population, such as the salient northern/southern division or socioeconomic divisions, 
we will focus on ethnicity herein because it has been the trait around which political violence has 
been perpetrated.  We do also recognize that ethnicity in the Rwandan case captures issues of 
socioeconomic position and political privilege.  
1990 marked the start of a four-year civil war in Rwanda; on October 1st of that year, 
Hutu-Tutsi conflicts escalated when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) - composed of Ugandan-
based Tutsi exiles invaded northern Rwanda.14  RPF soldiers were battle-tested from their 
participation in Yoweri Museveni’s overthrow of the Ugandan government.  The Rwandan 
government felt exceedingly threatened by the RPF’s attacks and responded in what was by then 
a predictable fashion by massacring Tutsis.15  The government-instituted policy of political 
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 Des Forges, 44. 
14
 In the late 1970s the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity was formed out of exiled Tutsis and in 1987 this 
group became known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).  
15
 The government conducted massacres at the following sites: Kibilira (October 1990), Ruhengeri (January 1991), 
Bugesera (March 1992), Kibuye (August 1992) and Gisenyi (December 1992).  This list of massacres can be found 
in Guy Martin’s “Readings of the Rwandan Genocide,” African Studies Review 45, no. 3 (December 2002): 19. 
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violence was intended to silence political opposition and attempts to push the government toward 
negotiations leading to peace.  However, it was not sufficient. Habyarimana’s authority was 
already crumbling, and the President further undermined his own legitimacy by displeasing 
many of his Hutu extremist followers.  They despised his consent for a new constitution that 
would allow for power-sharing with Tutsis and were again enraged when, in August of 1993, 
Habyarimana signed his name to the Arusha Accord, an agreement that specifically promised 
power-sharing with the RPF. 
From 1990 through 1994, political powerful Hutu extremists organized civilian death 
squads and radical militia groups that trained men to follow orders, act collectively and engage in 
mass killings.16  They also drew up lists of Tutsi leaders and political opponents, so that 
expeditious killings could be easily directed once mass violence was underway - they began 
planning a genocide. 
On April 6th 1994, Habyarimana’s jet was shot down over Kigali, and he, the Burundian 
President Ntaryamira and several other government officials were killed.  For prepared and 
organized Hutu extremists, this event was all the justification necessary for the death hunt 
against Tutsi leaders and Hutu moderates.  Within hours, many of Habyarimana’s moderate 
cabinet members were killed and the campaign to exterminate Tutsis spread to the public via 
media and word of mouth.  Radio propaganda against the Tutsi population had already been in 
full-force for one year and almost immediately after Habyarimana’s assassination, hate-filled 
broadcasts from the Hutu Power’s Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines encouraged Hutu 
civilians to take up arms against Tutsi ‘cockroaches’ (inyenzi).  Government-sponsored civilian 
militias, called the interahamwe (meaning “those who work together”), the Rwanda Government 
Forces (FAR), government and local officials, religious leaders and members of the police force 
                                                 
16
 Prunier, 242-24 and Des Forges, 87-95. 
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hunted all whom they wished to eliminate.  Roadblocks were established and militias formed to 
efficiently exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus.  Days passed and the violence intensified, 
sending Tutsis into flight across the borders of the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi.  Those 
Tutsi who remained inside the country were slaughtered as they sought safety in schools and 
churches, begged loved ones for a hiding place, or were killed in their homes and on the streets. 
Many have documented the international community’s knowledge of these events and its 
subsequent silence on the issue.17  Debates over the use of the term “genocide” paralyzed the 
international community, and representatives in the United Nations Security Council that pushed 
for military intervention were silenced (particularly by United States officials determined to 
smother attention so as to avoid any legal obligation to intervene in the genocide).  The genocide 
continued unabated for 100 days. 
As news of the genocide filtered out of the country, the RPF infiltrated Rwanda from the 
northeast in early April, trying to bring an end to the killings.  Though this army saved the lives 
of many Tutsis and moderate Hutus on their march towards the south and west, Human Rights 
Watch data on RPF actions at this time indicates that thousands of Hutu civilians and militia-
members were killed by the RPF in retaliation for the genocide that continued elsewhere in the 
country.18   This point is worth emphasizing: Hutu women and children were killed by the RPF 
as the troops moved towards Kigali to bring an end to the genocide.  These retaliatory killings 
occurred mainly in the northern areas of the country.  In other circumstances, the magnitude of 
these killings would have been newsworthy.  However, in this particular case, the genocide of 
Tutsis overshadowed RPF non-combatant killings.  The RPF captured Kigali on July 19th 1994.  
                                                 
17
 See Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis (1995) and Linda Melvern’s A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in 
Rwanda’s Genocide. (New York: Zed Books, 2000). 
18
 Des Forges, 692.  Des Forges also records RPF human rights violations committed since 1990 and before the 
genocide of 1994.  See Des Forges, 701-735. 
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However, violence did not end with the conclusion of the genocide, some 6,000 civilians were 
killed by the RPF in 1997, three years after the genocide.1  Most of the victims were Hutus 
concentrated in the northwest section of the country.  After the fall of Kigali, Hutu militia groups 
swept into the nation in order to massacre remaining Tutsis, spread hate-propaganda, and 
threaten the new Tutsi government.  In this setting, the RPF took violent and indiscriminate 
measures against the Hutu population, declaring that Hutu aggression justified its actions.19  The 
RPF established a government that consisted primarily of Tutsis.  Untold numbers of Hutu 
genocide perpetrators took refuge in countries around Rwanda after the RPF took control of the 
country. 20    Some remain in hiding, and many are suspected to have settled in the DRC, 
Tanzania and elsewhere.  Even after the genocide there was a wave of reprisal killings of Hutu 
by Tutsi both within and outside of Rwanda.  Violence between these two groups has cycled 
back and forth over time.   
                                                 
1
 Neuffer, 283. 
19
 Quoting the U.S. State Department, Elizabeth Neuffer writes, “‘The RPA committed hundreds of extrajudicial 
killings, including individuals and families, in the course of fighting the insurgency in the northwest’” (340).  See 
Neuffer’s The Key to My Neighbor’s House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (New York: Picador USA, 
2001): 283, 339-340. 
220
 We leave out the violence perpetrated in these refugee camps since they are outside of Rwandan territory and 
therefore legal jursidiction.  However, these acts do contribute to a full discussion of Rwandan cycles of violence.  
Lemarchand carefully addresses the “counter-genocide” of mass violence in the camps that received very little 
international attention.  RPF troops claimed the lives of thousands of Hutu civilians in Kibeho in 1995 and in eastern 
DRC camps.  The RPF, however, denies that its troops were ever involved in the widespread civilian killings, and 
insists that those that they did attack in refugee camps formed part of the interhamwe or ex-FAR.  RPF officials 
maintain that the security measures taken to protect Rwanda’s population against such militias entailed addressing 
any potential threats from the genocidaires hiding in refugee camps.  In contrast to their claims, research has 
concluded that only approximately five percent of the refugee population were former genocidaires and that the vast 
majority were innocent women and children.  Lemarchand writes, “Nothing is more specious than the argument that 
after the destruction of the refugee camps in November 1996, and the return perhaps of as many as half a million 
refugees to Rwanda, the only Hutu left behind were the genocidaires, and therefore that it was entirely legitimate for 
the Rwandan army to kill them in order [to] prevent them from doing further harm.  And yet this is precisely the 
subliminal ‘text’ that underlies the ‘cleansing’ operations of the Rwandan military in eastern Congo” (11). 
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PURSUING JUSTICE 
 After the genocide, the international community moved to respond to the events in 
Rwanda by establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania.  
The tribunal was designed to prosecute those responsible for organizing the genocide.  Both 
because of its narrow mandate and its limited success the United Nations war crimes tribunal for 
Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania has failed in its attempt to dispense justice to the victims and 
perpetrators of the genocide.  The millions of dollars and months of agonizing deliberation 
invested in the Tanzania court have resulted in fifteen trials at the time of this writing, nearly 10 
years after the genocide.  The failures of the UN tribunal for Rwanda far outweigh its benefits.  
The goal of the war crimes tribunal is only to prosecute the leaders of the genocide, but the 
process has been so excruciatingly slow that it is obviously an insufficient and inadequate 
response to the need to try those guilty of genocide. 
 Rwanda’s own judicial system was devastated during the genocide when nearly all judges 
and lawyers fled or were murdered.3  After the fall of Kigali, survivors from the legal profession 
were forced to work in impossible conditions with no equipment, staff or resources at their 
disposal.   To date, the nation’s courts have tried over 5,500 individuals.21  Given the resources 
available to them, this is, in fact, remarkable.  However, at this rate it would take over 200 years 
for all of the accused genocide perpetrators to stand trial.  The insufficiency of the International 
Tribunal in Arusha and the insurmountable caseload for the national courts in Rwanda have led 
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 Amnesty International (2002)  estimates there were ten lawyers left in the country after the genocide. 
21
 Martha Minow describes an event in April 1997 when twenty-two convicted genocide participants were executed 
in front of a fascinated and vengeful crowd of tens of thousands.  These death penalties were the first issued through 
the national courts and as Minow notes, “International human rights leaders objected that the underlying trials failed 
to comport with international standards of justice.  Some defendants had no legal representation; others had lawyers 
without time to prepare….Rather than ending the cycles of revenge, the trials themselves were revenge” [Martha 
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1998): 124.] 
 14 
the government to embark upon a third method for dealing with accused genocide perpetrators, 
called gacaca. 
 
GACACA PROCESS 
 Gacaca, Kinyarwanda for “justice on the grass,” is a judicial process in which the 
Rwandan public tries and judges those who wish to confess or have been accused of genocide 
crimes.4  In the pre-colonial era, gacaca was a popular indigenous forum for resolving local 
disputes over family matters, property rights and other local concerns.5  Village elders and 
community members would voluntarily gather together on a patch of grass to discuss civil 
disputes.  Elders would present a resolution to the issue in an effort to salvage social peace and 
cohesion in the village.  The current process differs from the traditional process in three key 
aspects: in the traditional process participation was voluntary; it was primarily used to deal with 
conflicts within a given community; and the judges or elders were given leeway to decide any 
punishment they wished within certain boundaries.  The highly regulated, national and 
involuntary gacaca process currently underway is substantially different from its traditional 
predecessor. 
The Rwandan government officially launched the present-day gacaca court system on 
June 18th 2002 in response to the overwhelming mass of prisoners whose cases remain untried 
since the genocide.  Estimates suggest that prior to January 2003 between 100,000 and 125,000 
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 The gacaca courts were established by Rwandan organic law number 40/2000  the 26th of January 2001.  The law 
applies to persons who, between October 1990 and the 31st of December 1994 committed crimes of genocide or 
crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined by the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 with the Additional Protocols of 1968.  Thus the law that created gacaca allows for the 
prosecution of war crimes in gacaca.  However, in practice they have been used solely to prosecute genocide crimes 
and these are delimited in time to the end of 1994 thereby excluding documented cases of RPF massacres in 1995 
(see footnote 20).    
5
 A discussion of the traditional gacaca courts can be found in Filip Reyntjens, “Le gacaca ou la justice du gazon,” 
Politique Africaine, (40), December 1990. 
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Rwandans awaited trial in overcrowded prisons.  In January of 2003 approximately 40,000 
prisoners were released.  20,000 of the oldest and most infirm were sent directly back to their 
villages and another 20,000 prisoners who had confessed and been sentenced went to solidarity 
camps where they undergo training and re-education before being released back into their 
communities.6  The rest of the prisoners await trial by gacaca and the national courts, or for the 
rare accused, by the UN Tribunal. 
The Rwandan government has always acknowledged that processes of justice, 
reconciliation and healing require that perpetrators be brought to account for their wrongdoing as 
quickly as possible.  Therefore, there is currently a strategy of pushing forward on three fronts – 
through the UN tribunal in Arusha, national courts and gacaca sessions – in the hope that the 
strengths of these approaches might compliment one another.  The dominant emphasis will, 
however, be on gacaca, since these community courts provide an affordable and participatory 
environment in which to try the backlog of cases of the thousands of foot soldiers of the 
genocide.22  Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission expects the grassroots 
tribunals to try the accused in categories two through four, meaning those accused of theft, 
looting, property destruction, and murder (and not those accused of distributing orders to carry 
out these crimes).23   The hope is that they will be tried within the next five years since the trials 
require minimal paperwork. 
                                                 
6
 “Rwanda: released genocide suspects begin re-education,” IRIN, January 31, 2003. 
22
 For an analysis of the effectiveness of gacaca, see Sandra F. Joireman, “Justice for a Genocide?,” The Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics 2, no. 2 (January 2003): 65-66. 
23
 The Rwandan government’s site outlines the standards used to categorize Rwandans who are accused of 
committing crimes between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.  Category 1 includes planners, instigators, 
leaders of the genocide and those who committed acts of sexual torture or violence.  Category 2 includes 
participators and conspirators in intentional murders.  Category 3 is designed for those guilty of serious assaults and 
Category 4 for persons who damaged and stole property.  For this outline, see 
http://www.rwanda1.com/government/ cited April 19 2003.  Provincial gacaca courts hear appeals for Category 2 
crimes and district gacaca courts hear appeals for Category 3 crimes.    
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Gacaca’s arrangement is unique and unlike other, more Western legal systems in which 
there is an emphasis upon the individual.  In the communal gacaca system, villagers and 
neighbors congregate in outside locations in cells throughout Rwanda in order to hear cases 
brought against accused killers and criminals. 24  Sets of judges who have undergone informal 
legal training are present to oversee the cases, but everyone in attendance is free to speak out.  
Attendees may voice corrections or additions to the information being presented, and criminals 
are permitted to either defend themselves or admit guilt.  There is no requirement for physical 
evidence and testimony alone is enough to decide a verdict. 
The pilot phase of the gacaca process was completed in 2002 and now the process has 
begun throughout the country.  Gacaca judges and community members compile lists of the 
names of those who were killed in the locality during the genocide, those who moved out of the 
area during that time (who perhaps relocated, fled or were killed elsewhere), and those accused 
of perpetrating genocide crimes.  The early stages of the gacaca process provide opportunity for 
criminals who have been imprisoned or who live freely in villages to come forward and confess 
so that they might receive a less severe sentence. 
 With a verdict of guilt, the criminal faces a scope of possible sentences ranging from 
obligations of community service to life imprisonment, but the guilty may not be sentenced to 
death (unlike in the national courts).  Officials estimate that thousands will be freed and will 
return to their villages and homes as gacaca trials proceed either because they are declared 
innocent or because they are sentenced to community service. 
                                                 
24
 Rwanda is divided up into provinces, prefectures, communes, secteurs and cellules.  Gacaca officials oversee 
activity at each of these levels.  Gacaca judges may try cases within Category 4 at the cellule level, Category 3 at the 
secteur level, category 2 at the commune level, and may hear appeals at the prefecture level.  See 
http://www.rwanda1.com/government/ for a break-down of gacaca court levels of authority. 
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 In October 2001 elections were held in urban and rural cells to select approximately 
255,000 men and women of integrity to serve as gacaca judges.25  The gacaca judges are 
endowed with significant responsibilities in order to arbitrate cases of collective violence.  Many 
are illiterate peasants and lack legal experience, but all have submitted themselves to local 
elections and brief legal training to prepare them for the work ahead.   
 Villagers attending gacaca sessions are much more than mere spectators to the 
proceedings.  Their interactions, accounts and testimonies play integral roles in the procedures 
since their descriptions and reports regarding the defendant directly affect the sentencing 
administered by the presiding judges.  In theory, their active participation contributes to political 
and personal reconciliation within the Rwandan population since people are given the 
opportunity to confront their attackers, tell their stories and express pent-up emotions all in a 
secure environment.26 
The government has embarked on a widespread campaign (by way of radio, television, 
word of mouth and visual advertisements) to inform and persuade its citizens to involve 
themselves in gacaca hearings.  The messages are also directed towards criminals who are 
eligible for reduced sentences if they confess their crimes.  In 2002, the Rwandan television 
station aired a well-advertised Kinyarwandan film that was intended to educate the public on 
gacaca.  This short movie told the fictional story of a young female victim living in post-
genocide Rwanda.  The teenage girl began attending secondary school where she instantly 
recognized one of her schoolteachers as her father’s killer.  After much deliberation, the young 
woman and her widowed mother approach gacaca officials.  The schoolteacher and his family 
                                                 
25
 Erin Daly, “Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,” New York University 
Journal of International Law & Politics 35, no. 2 (2002): 356. 
26
 This is the official government position.  We doubt the psychological and social benefits of the process due to the 
re-traumatization that can occur through testimony and the stigma that might accrue to some such as women giving 
testimony in rape cases. 
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discover that the truth of his participation in the genocide will soon be public knowledge, and so 
his wife encourages him to confess so that he might receive a lesser sentence.  The schoolteacher 
does, in fact, come forward to confess, and the film ends with a scene depicting the 
schoolteacher’s wife and the widow working together in the fields, thus illustrating the 
possibilities for reconciliation through gacaca.  This film represents the view of the government 
for the gacaca process.  We believe this view of the gacaca process to be naïve at best.  While 
gacaca in its traditional manifestation - elders solving conflicts brought to it by willing 
participants in the process - brought reconciliation to communities; the assumptions and the 
regulations of the contemporary gacaca process create an entirely different setting which will 
have different results. 
 
ASSESSING GACACA 
Some legal scholars have already voiced concern about the procedural issues in the 
gacaca courts, including deprivation of due process rights27 and evidentiary rules.28  From a 
purely legal standpoint, the gacaca process is flawed.  Judges unfamiliar with methods of legal 
interpretation will face difficulties in adjudicating extremely complicated cases and 
administering just penalties. 
Hutus and Tutsis alike are considerably apprehensive regarding the independence and 
impartiality of gacaca judges since nearly all of the elected individuals were involved in the 
events of the genocide to some degree.7  Rumors circulate regarding judges who partook in 
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 Daly, 356, Amnesty International 2002. 
28
 Joireman, 65-66. 
7
 African Rights, “Gacaca Justice: A Shared Responsibility,”  Kigali, Rwanda, report  January 2003. A report by 
CAGEP-Consult assessing the judicial sector in Rwanda for USAID surveyed people’s fears regarding the gacaca 
process. The main fears were that the truth would not be discovered, that the judges would not be impartial, that 
people would be retraumatized and that the gacaca process would be used to settle scores (70). 
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criminal activity or who have pent up anger and could potentially manipulate sentences to enact 
their own personal vengeance.  It is very likely that some judges will face genocidaires who 
killed or injured their own loved ones.  But these types of problems are not isolated to judges; 
even witnesses are likely to have some interest in the process alone and beyond ascertaining guilt 
or innocence.8 
Defendants in the gacaca process are brought to the community in which they allegedly 
committed the crime to stand before the judges and crowd.  The accused has no legal 
representation but is afforded the opportunity to speak out in self-defense if he/she so desires.  
Judges must perceptively distinguish the guilty from the innocent, even as they listen to complex 
stories involving circumstances of bribery, extortion, threats to “kill or be killed,” drug and 
alcohol induced states of mind, revenge, hatred, fear and ignorance.  In the enormous absence of 
evidentiary support, defendants will have little protection against the misrepresentation of facts 
and the effects of a personalized confrontation between victim and criminal. 
Many witnesses fear their central role in the gacaca process.  Friends of the killers have 
threatened the lives of unprotected and vulnerable orphans who might testify against their 
parents’ killers in the gacaca courts.  Rape victims fear personal encounters with those who raped 
them; the many people who were tortured during the genocide must face the creators of their 
scars.  The concerns of the witnesses also extend beyond the scope of what may happen during 
the hearings.  Many participants have expressed anxiety about their physical security once the 
gacaca process gets underway.  There is little-to-no protection for those who speak out against 
the accused, and cases of disappearance, murder, bribery and intimidation have already been 
                                                 
8
 These issues are all articulated as fears that people hold regarding the gacaca process and the impartiality of judges 
in the CAGEP-Consult  ‘Assessment of the Judicial Sector in Rwanda.’ 
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documented.29  A growing number of individuals involved in reconciliation, humanitarian and 
healing work in Rwanda are now voicing unease regarding the potential for trauma as victims 
and witnesses recount and relive the horrors that they experienced.30 
 
GACACA AND LONG-TERM SECURITY IN RWANDA 
The most serious security issue stemming from the gacaca process has not yet been raised 
in either the journalistic or the academic literature.  The gacaca process specifically excludes 
Tutsis involved in the massacre of civilians as the RPF gained control over the country.  In the 
rhetoric of the government, these “war crimes” are considered separate from the genocide and 
will not be tried by gacaca.  The gacaca tribunals have jurisdiction over individuals who have 
committed the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity under the previous government.9  
The text of the law establishing the gacaca courts allows for the inclusion of war crimes, but in 
practice the government has excluded war crimes from the gacaca process.10  Moreover, the 
jurisdiction of the gacaca courts is limited to crimes committed between October 1, 1990 and 
Dec 31, 1994, which eliminates many of the Tutsi killings of Hutu civilians. The exclusion of 
these crimes in the gacaca process establishes an ethnic divide and amounts to an unequal 
application of the law.31  We believe this politicized application of justice will ultimately 
undermine the security of both Hutus and Tutsis within Rwanda.  By referring to the crimes of 
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 Integrated Regional Information Network, IRIN@irinnews.org “Rwanda: Special Report on Hopes for 
Reconciliation under Gacaca Court System,” 4 December 2002, Listserv message (4 December 2002). 
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 The government does not consider this an ethnic policy since they declare that the gacaca process is for all crimes 
committed during the genocide.  It is simply that they make a distinction between the genocide and the war.  The 
actual law allows for the trying of war crimes in gacaca. 
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the Tutsi as “crimes of war” and the crimes of the Hutu as “crimes of genocide” the government 
has established a moral high ground for all Tutsis.  This position is difficult to challenge given 
the extreme depravity of the genocide and the sufferings of the Tutsi people, yet we contest it 
because we believe that all individuals should be held accountable for their actions.  Indeed 
national reconciliation demands that individual Tutsis must bear the responsibility for crimes 
committed against civilians during and after the genocide just as individual Hutus are held 
accountable for their crimes.  Without the equal application of the gacaca process to both Hutu 
and Tutsi, it will be interpreted more as revenge than as reconciliation.11 
In light of the evidence given by Human Rights Watch and other investigative agencies, 
“the greatest disservice that the international community could render to the cause of 
peace…would be to impute genocide only to the Hutu, as if the ‘good guy-bad guy’ dichotomy 
were largely synonymous with the Hutu-Tutsi split.”32  The Rwandan government essentially 
establishes this dichotomy as it takes on the challenge of administering justice in a nation where 
“victim” and “perpetrator” are two identities loaded with ethnic and historical connotation.  For 
example, at present the term genocidaire – one who commits genocide – implies Hutu ethnicity.  
Perpetuation of such oversimplified identifications will lead to future self-fulfilling prophesies of 
collective ethnic violence. 
Presently, the Hutu community has been pressured into silence regarding the Tutsi 
government and the gacaca process.  Personal communications with Hutus who are afraid to 
confront Tutsis in everyday settings exemplify the unspoken fears involved in speaking out 
against Tutsi leaders in post-genocide Rwanda.  Hutu will not cry out for a reform of the gacaca 
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 Again, we would like to emphasize that in terms of numbers, the vast majority of perpetrators of crimes against 
innocents were in fact Hutu.  Yet if the goal is national reconciliation justice must be seen as being impartial and 
impartiality means equally applied.   
32
 Lemarchand, 8. 
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process that would include the prosecution of Tutsi criminals since they fear being perceived as 
either power-hungry or sympathetic to the genocidaires.  Former RPF leader and current 
President Paul Kagame claims to speak for both Hutu and Tutsi when he publicly declares that 
gacaca will be dedicated solely to crimes committed during the genocide.  Though the 
administration of Paul Kagame has tried to address the broader setting of violence within which 
the genocide took place, for example through the establishment of a yearly open forum called the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, its actions in the application of justice are 
insufficient.  The right of the military victors to create a new set of rules and institutions with 
which to adjudicate past wrongs is unchallenged, yet in this case those institutions are so 
politicized that they appear destined to exacerbate the reoccurring cycles of violence in Rwandan 
history.  
Holding Tutsi citizens, including all RPF soldiers, accountable for murders, theft, rape 
and torture committed during and after the genocide is the only way to ensure equal justice.  Any 
attempts to hold an ethnic group (in this case, Hutus) collectively responsible for all crimes will 
only lead to future acts of collective retaliatory violence.  Individuals need to see themselves as 
personally responsible for their behavior.  Martha Minow aptly summarizes this issue in her 
warning,  
“To prevent lingering assignments of collective guilt, blame and punishment must 
be restricted to specific individuals and based on specific proof, itself tested 
through the adversary process.  The emphasis on individual responsibility offers 
an avenue away from the cycles of blame that lead to revenge, recrimination, and 
ethnic and national conflicts.”33 
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If gacaca continues to deal only with acts committed against Tutsis, then Hutus who have been 
victims at the hands of Tutsi Rwandans will be denied justice.12  In essence, this denial of justice 
is a failure to even acknowledge that such crimes were committed.  This will continue to alienate 
the Hutu masses and foster pent-up anger and frustration that could fuel another cycle of 
violence.  Leaving Tutsi accused out of the gacaca process endangers any effort at true 
reconciliation since reconciliation requires accountability. 
 Just as in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in South Africa led 
to a unified narrative of the apartheid years, so Rwanda’s gacaca courts have the potential to help 
form a unified narrative of the events that occurred from 1994 to 1996 in Rwanda.  There is, 
however, a critical difference in the two cases.  The African National Congress submitted itself 
to the authority of the TRC and thus was held accountable to the same standards as all other 
parties during apartheid.13  The relative success of the TRC and the peaceful transition of power 
in South Africa were due largely to the equality with which all victims and perpetrators were 
viewed.14  The Rwanda scenario, however, is not as hopeful since all truths cannot be told.  In 
the case of gacaca, a significant and crucial piece of the story is missing when Hutu victims are 
silenced and Tutsi perpetrators are not held accountable for their wrongdoings.  Even more 
disturbing, there is no broad acknowledgment to Rwandan society that Tutsi RPF soldiers and 
others even committed human rights violations.   
A just rendering of gacaca would lead to the revelation of truth and the punishment of the 
guilty.  A reconstructed gacaca would acknowledge all war crimes, and thus bring an end to the 
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moral distinction between human rights violations committed during the war and those 
perpetrated during the genocide.  The Rwandan government however is unlikely to take this step.  
They are predominantly Tutsi and feel that the terrible crimes committed against the Tutsi 
deserve punishment.  In this they are correct.  But retribution for Tutsis is not sufficient.  To 
move towards long-term security for all ethnic groups, the Rwandan government needs to also be 
concerned about reconciliation.  The Rwandan government has engaged in political rhetoric and 
numerous initiatives targeted at reconciliation, however, the reconciliation that they envision is 
politically constructed on Tutsi terms, which is insufficient for ensuring the long term security of 
Rwanda. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The gacaca process is underway.  The limits of the courts have been set and it is unlikely 
at this point that they will be changed.  That said, observers of the Rwandan court system and the 
international community should pressure the Rwandan government to expand the mandate of the 
courts to include those accused of crimes committed in “the war” thus intentionally including 
Tutsis among the accused.  This action has the potential of bringing about a more just gacaca 
process than what currently exists. 
 It is important that the post-genocide state in Rwanda be secure for Rwandan citizens of 
all ethnicities.  At the present time, people hold strong identifications with their ethnic groups.  
This influences the way they view history in general, their perceptions of the genocide, and the 
way that they are treated by the judicial system.  We believe this to be a fundamental problem.  
Institutions of government, of which the gacaca process is one, need to be blind to ethnic 
identification. 
 25 
The evil done against the Tutsi in the genocide stands out as one of the horrors of the 
twentieth century.  In no way would we like this paper to be seen as minimizing the suffering of 
Tutsi genocide survivors who understandably wish to see the genocidaires punished.  Tutsi 
genocide survivors must have a formal recognition and adjudication of their grievances.  Crimes 
were committed against the Tutsi during the genocide by individuals and those individuals need 
to be tried.  Crimes were also committed against Hutus during the war and those individuals 
must also be tried.  Crimes in both cases need to be attributed to individuals, not ethnic groups.  
The gacaca process should not be interrupted but rather expanded. 
The gacaca process may ultimately undermine the security of all Rwandans because it 
will aggravate ethnic fault lines in society.  It will serve a retributive function primarily for 
Tutsis and enforce longstanding grievances between ethnic groups.  Rwandan history 
demonstrates a cycling of violence between the Hutus and the Tutsis.  Nothing in the gacaca 
process, as currently implemented, leads us to expect that the cycles of violence will be 
interrupted and true reconciliation achieved.  Mahmood Mamdani has suggested that, “Rwanda’s 
key dilemma is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority alongside an 
aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community.”34  Judicial rules that apply 
equally to all are critical to establishing a political community in Rwanda that upholds the 
security of Hutu, Tutsi, Twa and all other citizens.   
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